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One day, during a long walk in the forest, I began crossing the shallow muddy waters 
of a stream to get on the other side of the shore, where the path continued. Carrying 
my backpack on the head, I oscillated from one side to the other, trying to maintain 
my sense of balance and avoid falling into the water with all my possessions. I was 
intent on doing this when Dina, my Runa host, who had quickly reached the other 
side of the river and had been attentively observing me from the shore, commented: 
ÔYou look like a tapir in the mud!Õ. Everyone present bursted out laughing, including 
myself. It was not the Þrst time that my Runa friends paralleled my clumsy 
movements to those of certain forest animals. The analogies usually sparked hilarity 
as well as attempts at mocking my ungraceful animal-like movements. Such remarks 
were not, however, only reserved for the inept anthropologist. Comments and 
observations like the one I received are a recurrent feature of every day life among 
the Runa who are perspicacious observers of their own and othersÕ movements. 
Based on thirty-six months of Þeldwork research among the Runa of Pastaza, 
an indigenous Kichwa-speaking population living in the Ecuadorian Amazon, this 
paper explores how moving is a central way in which the Runa experience a 
relationship of similarity with nonhuman others. Drawing upon anthropological and 
philosophical works on movement as well as research in developmental psychology 
and the neurosciences on the dynamic nature of intersubjectivity, in this paper I will 
suggest that movement and self-movement - understood here as the self-awareness 
of oneÕs movements - constitute an important means through which the Runa come 
to perceive nonhumans as human-like.
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The issue of how movement participates in the creation of relationships of 
similarity with nonhuman others is particularly salient for Amazonian anthropology 
which has consistently shown how indigenous people from this region of the world 
endow nonhuman entities with the capacity of thinking and leading human-like lives 
(Descola 2012; Fausto 2007; Kohn 2013; Lima 1996). This particular way of relating 
to nonhumans has been magisterially summarised by Eduardo Viveiros de Castro 
(1998) in his well-known model of Amazonian sociality. Building upon extensive 
regional ethnography, he suggests that Ôthe bodyÕ is conceived by indigenous 
Amazonian people as a set of Ôdispositions or capacities which render the body of 
every species unique: what it eats, how it moves, how it communicates, where it 
lives, whether it is gregarious or solitaryÕ (1998:478). Difference and similarity are 
thus conceived in corporeal terms: the difference between a human and an animal 
depends upon the speciÞc habitus or amalgam of substances unique to each species 
(Descola 2013; Santos Granero 2012). In Amazonian lived worlds, what instead both 
humans and nonhumans equally share is the possession of a soul or interiority, 
which takes the form of a human perspective. The Amazonian cosmos could be thus 
conceived as being populated by a vast array of beings which differ from each other 
in their bodily form but which all share the same Ôinternal human formÕ (Viveiros de 
Castro 1998: 471). This common human interiority is what enables processes of 
metamorphosis and transformation which so often populate Amazonian worlds. 
In his original theorisation of perspectivism, Viveiros de Castro included 
'movements' in the set of dispositions which characterise the making of a body. Yet, 
in Amazonian ethnography, the body is seldom explored as a body-in-movement. 
This means that we know little of the ways indigenous people move, the ways they 
think about movement, how they purposely enact certain movements with speciÞc 
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ends and the ways in which such movements might constitute meaningful ways to 
mark difference or resemblance between subjects. Even less we know about the 
ways in which movement may participate in creating relationships with nonhumans. 
How, for example, is movement involved in episodes of transformation or 
perspective-taking which so frequently appear in the Amazonian ethnographic 
literature? 
In this paper I seek to advance an analysis of movement and, in particular, self-
movement among the Runa so as to offer a fresh perspective through which to look 
at human-nonhuman relationships. Through an analysis of a bodily condition known 
as paju, I will Þrst describe how the Runa develop an awareness of their own 
movements in relation to those of nonhuman others. Then, building upon an 
ethnographic example from the realm of pottery-making, I will show how self-
movement - understood as the awareness of oneÕs own movement - allows Runa 
people (and here, more speciÞcally, Runa women) to align themselves to a 
nonhuman entity known as the Grandmother of Clay. Movement becomes a common 
ÔformÕ (Kohn 2013): a pattern which both human and nonhumans share and which 
enables them to affect each other.
The anthropology of moving selves
Despite the renovated interest on the body and the senses in anthropological theory 
(Csordas 2002; Pink 2009) ethnographic research on movement is still in its infancy. 
This is striking if one considers that Ôno [human being] perceives except on condition 
of being a self of movementÕ (Merleau Ponty 1968: 257). This omission may be due 
to the ßeeting character of movement or to its being something so embedded in our 
daily lives to often go unnoticed (Sheets-Johnstone: xix). One of the earliest 
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anthropological writers to acknowledge movement as a subject worthy of theoretical 
attention was Marcel Mauss (1985[1936]) who, in a now famous essay, suggested 
Þrst, that all bodily techniques have a degree of motricity and secondly, that the way 
one moves, just like other bodily techniques, is socially determined. 
Movement has also been a fundamental subject of enquiry in the 
phenomenologically inspired works of Tim Ingold (2000; 2011) and Brenda Farnell 
(2012) who have both called for the centrality of the moving body within social theory. 
In her work on dance, Farnell suggests we need to attend to the kinaesthetic 
character of bodies and, in so doing, look at the ways in which meaning is created 
through movement and gesture. She proposes to see bodily movement as a sensory 
modality in itself and therefore, Ôas a potential resource for meaning-making or 
semiosisÕ (2012:121). In her view, movements are not pre-reßective and pre-
conceptual ways of inhabiting the world but rather a fundamental way in which 
people produce meaning. Like Farnell, Ingold also forcefully suggests to 
acknowledge the fundamental relationship between movement and perception. 
Inspired by James GibsonÕs psychology of perception (1979), Ingold argues that 
Ôlocomotion, not cognition, must be the starting point for the study of perceptual 
activityÕ (Ingold 2011:46). For Ingold, perception is intrinsically linked to the body as it 
moves and interacts within a given environment. It is by virtue of our sensorimotor 
capacities as they are deployed within the environment in the pursuit of activity that 
we perceive. In this view, moving is, quite literally, knowing.  As Ingold stresses, this 
does not mean Ôthat you know by means of movement but that knowing is 
movementÕ (Ingold 2013:1, my emphasis).
A similar argument has been advanced by philosopher Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone (1999) in her work on movement and self movement. Like Ingold and 
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Farnell, Sheets-Johnstone suggests that movement should not be considered as a 
way of gathering knowledge about the environment, but rather as a speciÞc kind of 
knowledge in itself. Drawing upon the work of developmental psychologists, she 
argues that the awareness of oneÕs movements we are all born with is our Ôprimal 
sensibilityÕ (136). Sheets-JohnstoneÕs shift from movement to Ôkineasthetic 
consciousnessÕ (130) which she understands as a Ôdynamic sense-making of the 
worldÕ (128), is important. To say that by moving one acquires knowledge about the 
world, she argues, operates within a ÔnaturalisticÕ account of the world whereby 
movement is merely a mechanism to acquire information. Commenting on GibsonÕs 
theorization of ecological perception, she argues that, while Gibson acknowledges 
the importance of locomotion as a means to perceive, he nevertheless sees the real 
business of perception as occurring through other senses, the visual, the auditory 
and the olfactory. By conßating kineasthesis Ñ proprioception Ñ with other sensorial 
modalities, Gibson readily misses Ôthe qualitative structure of movementÕ (205) and 
does not do justice to Ôthe experience of movement - self-movement' (266). Instead, 
she prompts us to understand self-movement as a way of knowing in itself thereby 
shifting our attention upon some of the processes which take place during movement 
itself. One of these is the process by which we perceive others as 'like' us. 
Sheets-JohnstoneÕs work draws directly upon research done on infantsÕ 
imitative behaviour by developmental psychologist Andrew Meltzoff (2007). In a path-
breaking study conducted with infants, Meltzoff observed that since a few days after 
birth, babies are able to imitate adultsÕ gestures. The experiments led Meltzoff to 
develop the ÔLike meÕ hypothesis which suggests that infants, when seeing other 
peopleÕs movements (for example, tongue protrusion), compare them with their own 
felt movements.The comparison between seen acts and the experience of oneÕs own 
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movements is what allows infants to attribute intentionality to others and thus to 
recognise them as Ôlike meÕ. This Þnding, as Sheets-Johnstone readily points out, has 
major philosophical implications in so far as it posits self-movement as the very 
foundation for knowing about the self and others.
I think this observation has major implications for anthropology too. Given the 
disciplineÕs interest in human-nonhuman relationships - expressed by the so called 
nonhuman turn (Grusin 2015) and the renewed discussion around ÔanimismÕ (Harvey 
2005) - an analysis of how movement plays out in the perception and understanding 
of other beingsÕ animacy could offer a refreshing perspective to these debates. The 
close relationship between movement and animism has already been pointed out by 
Tim Ingold (2011) in his work on life. Arguing that scholars of animism mistakenly 
conceptualise animacy as a substance to be infused in entities or substances, Ingold 
suggests that such view does not account for many phenomena, such as 
meteorological events, which are perceived as ÔaliveÕ by some indigenous people. He 
suggests instead an intrinsic relationship between life and movement and the 
ÔprimacyÕ of this latter in animist ontologies (2011:72).
IngoldÕs account does not speciÞcally address the nexus between self-
movement and others' movements cogently pointed out by Sheets-Johnstone as 
being foundational for cognition. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the self-
awareness which emerge from moving comes from Rane WillerslevÕs (2007) 
ethnography of hunting practices among the indigenous Yukaghir of Siberia. 
Willerslev describes how, to hunt an elk, Yukaghir hunters seek to temporally act as if 
they were elks themselves. They do so by wearing elk skin covered skis, which 
imitate the sound of the moving animal. Most importantly, however, the hunter begins 
to move like the elk, swinging slowly from side to side. During this imitation process, 
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the hunter comes to grasp two perspectives at the same time. If, on the one hand, he 
perceives himself as a subject who sees the animal as an object, on the other, he is 
also aware of himself as an ÔobjectÕ in the eyes of the subject-elk. The movement 
allows the hunter to see himself both as object and subject simultaneously. It is this 
double perspective which enables Yukaghir hunters to perceive elks as subjects 
possessing a human-like perspective. 
WillerslevÕs account of the dynamic and embodied dimension of perspective-
taking is particularly apposite to the argument I will be developing here. In the 
following pages, I will show how, similarly to the Yukaghir, the Runa recognise 
movement as a fundamental instance where the similar nature of humans and 
nonhumans is revealed. 
Runa ways of moving
For the Runa the way one moves is extremely important.1 People readily notice the 
improper movements someone might perform when serving manioc beer or holding a 
machete. People also closely observe the movements of animals they encounter in 
the forest and are able to reproduce such movements accurately. They can imitate 
the particular gait of a capybara as well as the dance of certain birds in the sky. The 
importance of movements for the Runa becomes most obvious in the case of a 
special bodily condition called paju. The term paju is used by the Runa of Pastaza 
with two different meanings, one denoting a state of ÔillnessÕ and another which has 
connotations of potency. During my Þeldwork, the Runa mentioned instances of paju 
on a daily basis and often did so in the most disparate occasions. Yet, despite its 
multifarious manifestations, all instances of paju are underlain by a common 
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characteristic: an attention to movement. Let me explain this with an ethnographic 
example.
One day, my host grandmother, her granddaughter Maria and I came home 
from the garden, carrying three baskets full of peeled manioc. Tired of the work and 
sweaty for the tropical heat, Maria, who was then six year old, rushed to bathe 
herself in the nearby river, leaving her basket full of manioc lying on the kitchen ßoor. 
Upon return, her grandmother severely scolded her. Did she wanted to get paju? 
What did she think of, when she left the basket with the manioc inside? If she left the 
basket like that, in the future, when about to give birth, she would not be able to push 
the baby out. The baby would get stuck, like the manioc was stuck inside the basket 
on the kitchen ßoor. ÔTas tas tas, empty the basket nowÕ, the grandmother intimated 
Maria. The little girl quickly grabbed the basket and turned it up side down, emptying 
its content on the ßoor. 
In this episode, MariaÕs grandmother was referring to what is known by the 
Runa as the basketÕs paju (ashanga paju). Many analogies run through the basket 
paju. The Þrst one refers to the alignment between manioc and children. Both manioc 
and children are considered by the Runa as female creations and possessions and 
are addressed in maternal terms.2 Furthermore, both grow ÔinsideÕ (ukui), respectively 
in the earth (allpai) and in the womb (huicsai). The second analogy concerns the 
uterus and basket (ashanga). The two objects serve to contain and carry precious 
things (manioc and children). Moreover the Runa claim that their ancestors have 
created the Þrst basket copying the shape of a birdÕs nest (tasi). The birdÕs nest, in 
turn, has uterine connotations: for instance, the coming out of a child and a mother 
from the postpartum seclusion, understood as a kind of social birth, is described by 
the Runa as Ôcoming out of the nestÕ (Huahua tasimanda llukshishca). The third 
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analogy in the paju described above concerns the passage between interior and 
exterior (inside and outside the basket/uterus). This last analogy however contains a 
further analogical relationship between the vertical position of the baby in the uterus 
and that of the manioc inside the basket. Runa women always place manioc roots 
upright in the basket so that they jointly form an interlocking whole. Similarly, a fetus 
is conceived by the Runa to be ÔuprightÕ, in a vertical position, in his motherÕs womb. 
This analogy thus creates a parallel between the movement of expulsion of the 
manioc from the basket and the movement of expulsion of the baby from the womb. 
In the basketÕs paju, several alignments between single entities (the manioc and the 
baby, the basket and the uterus) become expressed and materialised through a 
movement: the emptying of a basket. The relationships of similarity between basket 
and uterus, between manioc and children become visible only through the movement 
of turning upside down the basket. But there is more: in the basketÕs paju, it is not 
only single entities which become aligned, but, importantly, also their movements. 
What children and manioc share in this case of paju is not only a static formal 
resemblance but, importantly, the movement of being upright and then expelled from 
a receptacle. Underlying the basketÕs paju is thus a perceptual awareness of the 
dynamic resemblances between different entities. 
The basketÕs paju considered so far is an example of paju understood by the 
Runa as ÔillnessÕ. However, illness is a slightly misleading term since the Runa have a 
speciÞc term for illness and disease which is conceptually and semantically distinct 
from paju. Ungui - the Kichwa word for illness - is thought to be caused by an evil 
wind or a shamanic attack and requires the complex intervention of a specialist, 
usually a shaman or healer. On the contrary, most instances of paju cannot be 
healed and their origins are accidental. You simply happen, as the Runa say, to ÔgetÕ 
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paju (paju chimbanga). Children are particularly susceptible of falling into the 
condition of paju because they do not know yet how to properly ÔmoveÕ around. 
The mindlessness of oneÕs movements has, for the Runa, real and dangerous 
effects. To make another example: one afternoon I was sitting with my friend Sabina, 
aged about twelve, washing clothes with her paternal aunt Gloria. SabinaÕs mother, 
who just had a baby, instead of helping us to wash the clothes, stood nearby chatting 
with us. After a while, she returned home. When she disappeared in the bush, Gloria 
explained to Sabina: ÔYour mother cannot wash clothes. You see, when you wring the 
water out, like that [doing the movement of wringing], the baby also starts moving like 
that, and then it can become very dangerous. He might even dieÕ. The paju described 
here builds upon a parallel between the wringing out of water and the twisting of a 
baby body. It represents a case of couvade paju, in so far as the improper 
movements of the mother cause the replication of movements in the babyÕs body. 
Here, the enactment of a movement has adverse consequences as it can be 
replicated by another subject with dreadful consequences. 
I wish to explore now on pajuÕs other meaning, which I have glossed as 
ÔpotencyÕ. In this context, paju refers to the capacity of people to manipulate their own 
movements in order to affect others, generally nonhuman bodies. For example, after 
the planting of a poisonous root used in Þshing, barbasco (Lonchocarpus sp.), young 
boys are explicitly instructed not to stand up for a long time. This would cause the 
plant to sink deep down in the earth, just like the body is standing vertically on the 
earth. Instead, boys are told to go to lay down in bed. In this way, the barbasco will 
grow horizontally, just like the body of its grower. This sequence of movements too is 
referred as paju, but rather than denoting a state caused by the improper sequences 
of movements, here it refers to the cunning manipulation of oneÕs movements to 
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affect the movements of others. An even more explicit example of this paju as 
potency was revealed to me during a hunting trip in the company of my compadre 
and his seven years old son. As my compadre suddenly spotted a pregnant capuchin 
monkey up on a tree, he quickly broke a stick, handed it to his seven years old son 
and instructed him to insert it under his belt. The boy quickly obeyed and then both 
disappeared to chase the monkey. Later on, on our way home, my compadre 
explained to his son the logic beyond his gesture:
You insert it upright in their belt. You do this and the mother monkey will drop the 
baby down. The baby monkey will fall down, just like that [making a vertical 
movement] Just like the stick you put under your belt. 
In this example, my compadre paralleled the vertical movement of placing a stick 
under the belt to the vertical fall of the little monkey. Again, in this case, the analogy 
set in motion by paju is not that between two single entities, the monkey and the 
stick, but rather between two movements: the vertical placing of the stick and the 
vertical fall of the monkey. As we have seen from this and the previous ethnographic 
examples, all instances of paju are underscored by two fundamental assumptions: 
Þrst, that humans and nonhumans share certain similar movements and secondly, 
that oneÕs body movements can affect and be affected by the movements of 
nonhumans.
These two propositions strongly recall Eduardo KohnÕs (2013) recent work on 
ÔformsÕ. Drawing upon ethnographic research conducted among the çvila Runa, 
Kohn stresses that all life has semiotic possibilities and that, as such, trans-species 
engagements is made possible by the very semiotic forms entities share. Forms are 
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understood by Kohn as self-emergent phenomena which result from constraints on 
possibility (159). For instance, Kohn describes how in his dreams, he began to 
perceive the forest as a domestic place, just like the Runa claim this is what it looks 
like from the point of view of the forest masters. He suggests that what makes 
Amazonian forest ecologies and human economies to be aligned in dreams Ôis the 
pattern or form that such systems shareÕ (157). In this example, the pattern concerns 
the speciÞc way in which both ecological and economic wealth is accumulated, 
resources scattered and distributed and so forth. For Kohn, it is precisely because of 
the isomorphic correspondences of form which exist in the world that human and 
nonhumans can communicate and impinge upon each otherÕs lives.3
KohnÕs argument is too complex to do it full justice in this short piece. Yet, his 
mention of form is important here as, in the cases of paju considered so far, 
movement could be considered exactly as one of the ÔformsÕ described by Kohn. 
Movements are instances which emerge from speciÞc Ôconstraints on possibilityÕ: the 
receptacle shape of the uterus and the basket from which the contained comes out, 
the vertical position of a stick and the vertical fall down from a branch. As such, Ôthe 
formsÕ of movement are limited and recurrent: furthermore, as the Runa 
acknowledge, they do not pertain to the human realm only but Ôpropagate in the 
worldÕ (Kohn 2013:157) across species boundaries. The basket and the uterus, the 
stick and the baby monkey: these different entities become aligned through their 
shared form: movement. Instances of paju thus reveal ÔformÕ: the potentiality for 
certain movements to be shared by all entities in the world. Built upon the 
acknowledgement of such shared forms, paju effectively works as to sustain Runa 
awareness of them through daily practice. It does so, I suggest, in multiple ways. 
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First, to inhabit a landscape in which paju is felt as an inherent presence 
requires you to develop a self-awareness of movements. I could feel this on my own 
skin as my Runa hosts kept warning me about my clumsy movements and giving me 
instructions on how to properly move around. They gently but Þrmly reminded me 
and their children about the potential resemblances of my own movements with those 
of a multiplicity of nonhuman beings. My hostsÕ efforts had the consequence of 
making me grow aware of the way I moved around. But not only: since I was 
constantly reminded that the way one moves has important consequences for oneÕs 
self and others, proprioception came together with the awareness of oneÕs body 
relationship to others. From the point of view of someone who learns about paju, for 
example a child or an anthropologist, the continuous emphasis upon the connection 
between human and nonhuman movements has the effect of making one receptive 
of the perceptual resemblances between humans and nonhumans. Through an 
Ôeducation of attentionÕ (Ingold 2001), Runa people effectively come to perceive both 
as sharing some common movements. They become mindful of the Ôrhythmicity of 
the bodyÕ, as Andr Leroi-Gourhan (1993: 282) deÞned it, perceptive to the recurrent 
regularities of movements which they share with nonhumans. Having shown how the 
Runa acknowledge and exploit similarities through movement, in the next section I 
will suggest that it is through a particular dimension of movement - self-movement - 
that Runa people take the perspective of nonhuman others and, in the process, 
reconstitute themselves and others as ÔalikeÕ.
Moving alike
The Runa are well known over the region for their Þne pottery-making skills.4 A 
female-only occupation, pottery making occupies a large amount of time in daily 
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lives. This Þne process is learnt either from an early age, by observing female kin 
making pots or at the time of marriage, after a quick but intense apprenticeship with 
female in-laws. Runa potters unanimously stress, however, that the most powerful 
means through which pottery knowledge is acquired, is the encounter with the 
Grandmother of Clay (mangallpa apamama) also known as the Ôowner of clayÕ. 
Among the Runa, as elsewhere in Amazonia (Fausto 2012), many entities, from 
rivers to animals and underground caves, have their spiritual owner (in Kichwa, amu). 
The Grandmother of Clay is described as an old small woman, covered with mud or 
ashes (ushpa cushni tica). She usually appears in a myth which describes how she 
helps a young Runa woman to learn to make pottery. The following version was told 
by Rosa, a Runa woman in her Þfties, as we were making pottery in her house:
It was time of jista (Runa festival).5 A man had become a ceremonial helper 
(ayurante). His wife didnÕt know anything about pottery making and she was very 
worried. She begged other women to tell her where she could Þnd clay but the 
women refused. One day, when the women went off to gather clay she followed 
them. The women took the best clay and left other pieces of clay thrown on the soil. 
After the women went home, she came out and saw an old woman standing near the 
clay deposit. The grandmother was very upset and said: ÔWhy do you waste clay like 
that?Õ. The woman told the grandmother that the other women didnÕt want to help her. 
The grandmother then gave her the clay leftovers, tapped her hands with huihuishcu 
[a special nutshell] and told her to go home to weave her pottery. The woman went 
home and, all of a sudden, she began making beautiful pottery. Her pottery never 
cracked when Þred and she was able to give her husband many vessels for the 
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festival, while the pottery of the envious women cracked and they had nothing to give 
to their husbands.
Rosa conÞded in me that, like the girl in the story, she too had encountered the 
Grandmother of Clay in a dream. Many other research participants described similar 
dreams in which the Grandmother of Clay tapped their hands with huihuishcu, a 
polished shell of the pilchi fruit (Crescentia cujete) used as a tool in pottery-making. 
Potters repeatedly described such dream encounters as turning points in their lives, 
moments in which they truly become knowledgeable (yachayuj) in pottery matters.
I would like now to draw attention to the movement of ÔtappingÕ which appears 
as central in RosaÕs story and indeed, in all dream narratives I heard during my 
Þeldwork. The gesture of tapping is performed by the mythical grandmother to the 
hands of the woman-dreamer. It consists of a soft movement executed with the 
huihuishcu on the back of the hands. Through this movement, the Grandmother of 
Clay transmits her knowledge to the dreamer. Such gesture is not solely the 
prerogative of the Grandmother of Clay. The sight of an old woman tapping the hands 
of their granddaughters with huihuishcu is a common occurrence in any Runa 
villages. Elderly women refer to this activity as one of ÔstraighteningÕ womenÕs hands 
(allichina, literally Ômaking them goodÕ). 
The gesture of tapping womenÕs hands movement replicates another one: the 
tapping which occurs during the technical process of pottery-making. Runa pottery is 
entirely hand coiled. During pottery-making, coils are positioned around a circular 
clay base one on top of the other and pressed together. Coil after coil, the pot begins 
to acquire a cylindrical shape. The soft surface of the pot is continuously smoothed 
by the expert use of huihuishcu. On the outer surface of the pot, huihuishcu is used 
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vertically, to scrape away the excess clay, whilst on the inside, it is moved circularly 
so as to create the characteristic ÔbellyÕ of pots. After smoothing the surface and 
removing excess clay, Runa potters gently begin tapping the pot with the nutshell. 
This continuous tapping Ð a gesture which potters automatically execute at the right 
moment - ensures that the pot reaches a harmonious shape. With this movement, 
the woman ÔstraightensÕ the pot as well as giving it balance. It is a technically efÞcient 
movement in so far as it gives the pot the stability and symmetry which would 
otherwise lack. It is also a highly formalized gesture, virtually identical among all 
Runa potters. 
What does this small gesture tell us? First, it is worth noticing that, through a 
movement of the body Ð the gesture of tapping - two entities previously separated 
are momentarily aligned. This is case of the soft clay and of girlsÕ hands who both 
become ÔsubjectÕ to the tapping with huihuishcu. Through this gesture, grandmothers 
initiate an analogy between female bodies and clay.6 The analogy is further 
corroborated by the term used to describe both actions, allichina, Ôto straighten upÕ, 
and by other linguistic elements, for example, the names used to refer to parts of 
pots which parallel human body parts (e.g. the ÔbellyÕ of a pot is called with the same 
term, huicsa, to indicate the human belly). It is however, the movement of tapping 
which materially brings to light the relatedness of the two single entities. 
More importantly, through this gesture, grandmothers align themselves to the 
mythical Owner of Clay. Grandmothers become ÔalikeÕ the Grandmother of Clay. The 
relationship of similarity is expressed by the Runa using the sufÞx -shina, which can 
be translated as ÔalikeÕ. What does this ÔalikeÕ refer to? What does it mean to say that, 
through the gesture of tapping, the Grandmother of Clay and grandmothers become 
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ÔalikeÕ?  I suggest that ÔalikenessÕ here refers to the imaginative perspective-taking 
which takes place through the movement of tapping. 
Writing about movement and the development of empathy, neuroscientist 
Vittorio Gallese (2003) notices how, when observing other peopleÕs movements, we 
draw upon our own kinaesthetic experiences to infer what the other may be feeling. 
This dynamic imagination, argues Gallese, is the enabling foundation of empathy, 
understood by him as the capacity of perspective-taking.7 I believe that, in the case 
of tapping, a similar imaginative perspective-taking stance is happening. In 
replicating a mythical movement, that of the Grandmother of Clay, Runa women put 
themselves, although temporarily, into the Grandmother of ClayÕs shoes. In the 
awareness of their own felt movements, Runa women grasp the human like nature of 
the Grandmother of Clay.8 They imagine what is like to be her. 
It could be objected, the situation here looks far more complicated than the case 
of imitation described by Gallese. In the case of tapping there is no direct ÔotherÕ 
whose actions are being observed and imitated. The Grandmother of Clay does not 
stand next to the women potters as a tangible individual to be imitated: the 
Grandmother of Clay is, after all, a spirit. However, I do not think that the nonhuman 
nature of the Grandmother should invalidate the claim. A recent number of 
ethnographic works in the anthropology of religion have suggested (Blanes and 
Esprito Santo 2013) to treat spirits as real entities - or at least, as Ômethodologically 
realÕ (Bubandt 2009) - in so far as their presence has tangible consequences upon 
human lives. As Jon Bialecki has recently observed, a spiritual or intangible entity 
must be conceived Ôas being equivalent to all other objects in its potentiality of both 
affecting and being affected by all other objects, human and otherwise, with which it 
becomes entwinedÕ (2014:41). Considering the Grandmother of Clay as a real entity 
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which exerts a considerable agency upon clay, the process of pottery making and 
women potters allows us to conceive of tapping not as any movement but rather as 
her unique ancestral movement, the movement through which she Þrst bestowed 
Runa women with the gift of knowledge. This also allows us to understand tapping as 
a way in which the nature of Runa grandmothers and the mythical Grandmother are 
mutually reconstituted as ÔalikeÕ. Through this dynamic perspective-taking not only 
does the Runa potter become like the Grandmother of Clay but this latter too is 
simultaneously re-constituted, in daily practice, as a human-like entity, as an entity 
sharing some human form. However, Runa women are not projecting their own felt 
movements onto those of the Grandmother, performing a kind of anthropomorphistic 
projection onto nonhuman others. As noticed by philosopher Christoph Hoerl, we 
should not assume that knowledge Ôfrom the insideÕ corresponds to Ôknowledge 
pertaining to me onlyÕ (Hoerl 2002:9). Any imitation is underscored by the subtle 
acknowledgement that Ôwhat we are doing is something [others] are capable of doing 
themselvesÕ (11). Instead than merely ÔimputingÕ a humanity to nonhumans, the Runa 
seem to continuously face, through every day movement, the Ôunlike and yet so 
alikeÕ (Brunois 2005: 372) nature of human and nonhuman worlds. 
Conclusions
In this article, I have argued that moving is a fundamental way in which Runa people 
establish relationships with nonhuman others. Drawing upon my ethnographic 
research among the Runa, I have shown how, through moving, Runa people align 
themselves with nonhumans and thus come to perceive themselves and others as 
ÔalikeÕ. This happens through a variety of ways. Paju, I suggested, represents 
perhaps the most conspicuous instance where such relationships of similarity are 
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both revealed and reasserted through movement. The potential ubiquity of paju in 
Runa lives is a constant reminder of intra-species similarity and the potential intrinsic 
to it. Whether such likeness constitutes a beneÞt or a threat depends ultimately on 
the context, the will and knowledge of those who participate to the encounter. In the 
second section, I explored the meaning of a seemingly unimportant gesture - a 
gesture as minute as the movement of a polished shell on clay - showing how, 
through this, Runa potters come to perceive their bodies as alike those of 
nonhumans. In both cases, the Runa acknowledge that humans and nonhumans 
share speciÞc patterns of movements and that such similarity enables them to affect 
each other. 
Having read up to this point, one could legitimately ask: is this 
acknowledgement the consequence or the cause of Runa animistic way of life? In 
other words, do such instances of dynamic perspective-taking constitute the 
foundations of Runa ways of relating to the nonhuman world? In the aforementioned 
ethnography, Willerslev suggests that the human-animal encounters which take place 
during hunting could be identiÞed as a possible locus of the emergence of Yukaghir 
animist attitude (2007: 27). My aim in this paper is more modest. I do not claim such 
mimetic movements to constitute the origins of Runa animism, yet I believe that it is 
through everyday movements that others - be they the Grandmother of Clay or a 
capuchin monkey - continue to be perceived as ÔlikeÕ us.
The form of ÔlikenessÕ I have described here is hard to pin down. Movements 
come and go and they sometimes only last a few seconds yet such ßeeting 
similarities may have larger implications for understanding how relationships with 
nonhumans are sustained through every day practice. The question is central in 
Amazonian anthropology where human-nonhuman relationships, bodily 
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transformation and alterity Þgure as central research themes and yet the moving 
body has been rarely taken into account. The focus on movement not only questions, 
as already pointed out by Jean-Pierre Warnier (2001), the analytical boundaries 
between subjects and objects but also prompts questions about the qualities of 
animacy itself. What is the relationship between movement and animacy? In what 
ways can movement help us to think about the ways in which others can be like us 
while simultaneously not being us? In this paper I have begun to address these 
issues by exploring the ways in which the Runa, through movement, come to 
discover the similar nature of others. 
Notes
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1 It is worth noticing that there is no Kichwa word for ÔmovementÕ as such. Rather 
than an abstract concept of movement, Runa speakers use onomatopoeic and sound 
symbols (Nuckolls 1996) to refer to very speciÞc movements (e.g. twisting, going in 
circles).
2 For an analysis of the connections between manioc and children as well as idioms 
of female ownership see Guzmn-Gallegos (1997) and Mezzenzana (2015).
3 ÔFormÕ has also emerged as a central concept in research on indigenous Lowland 
South America art, for instance, in Elsje LagrouÕs (2007) path-breaking work on 
Cashinahua designs and Paolo FortisÕs (2013) investigation of Kuna art and wood 
carving. 
4 For a detailed ethnographic account of Runa pottery-making see Whitten and 
Whitten (2008).
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5 Ceremonial festivals (jista) among the Canelos Runa consist of reciprocal visits to 
the ceremonial houses, with exchange of food and manioc beer. For detailed 
ethnographic accounts of the festival see Guzmn-Gallegos (1997), Mezzenzana 
(2014), Reeve (1988) and Whitten (1976).
6 It is no coincidence that it is elders (rucuguna) who know well how to move their 
bodies which engage in the practice of tapping other peopleÕs hands. Young people 
need instead to be Ôstraightened upÕ and made hard through continuous practice.The 
learning of pottery making could be conceived as one of such moments of 
Ôstraightening upÕ whereby the body is taught about its proper movements and its 
place in relation to other entities.
7 Empathy here is not to be understood in its popular usage, as the inherently 
positive ability of sharing the feelings of others but, rather, as a Ôneutral capacityÕ of 
taking anotherÕs perspective (de Waal 2009:211).
8 Nuckolls similarly argued that, through the use of speciÞc words which mimic 
natural sounds, the Runa are able to focus on the action described in the narrative 
and Ôto project into an experienceÕ(Nuckolls 1996: 76). She further suggests that, by 
enacting natural sounds, the Runa are effectively able to take up the perspective of 
nonhuman agents and express their subjective point of view while fostering an 
empathetic relationship with them (Nuckolls and Swanson forthcoming).
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